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Abstract: Surveillance programs on farms and in the local environment provide an 
essential protection against the importation and spread of exotic diseases. Combined with 
border quarantine measures, these programs protect both consumers and producers from 
major health concerns and disease incursions that can potentially destroy local 
agricultural production and supporting industries, as well as generate substantial losses in 
trade and tourism. However, surveillance programs also impose costs in the form of 
expenditures on the surveillance program itself, along with the costs of disease 
management and eradication should an incursion occur. Taking border quarantine 
expenditures as given, this paper develops a stochastic optimal control model (with a 
jump-diffusion process) to determine the optimal level of surveillance activity against a 
disease incursion by minimizing the present value of the major direct and indirect costs of 
the disease, as well as the cost of the surveillance and disease management and 
eradication programs. The model is applied to the case of a potential entry and spread of 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United States. Results show that current surveillance 
expenditures are far less than optimal.  
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The development of trade between regions and countries is an increasingly important 
characteristic of modern agriculture. Over the last two decades the gross value of 
agricultural trade has more than doubled, from $USD 234 billion in 1980 to $USD 522 
billion in 2003 (FAO 2005a). With this increase in trade goes an increased likelihood of a 
disease or harmful pest incursion. In this regard, surveillance programs on farms and in 
the local environment provide an essential protection against the importation and spread 
of exotic diseases and pests. Combined with border quarantine and inspection services, 
these programs protect both consumers and producers from incursions that could 
potentially destroy local agricultural production and supporting industries, as well as 
generate substantial losses in trade and tourism. The key objective of surveillance 
activities is ‘early detection’, or becoming aware of the presence of an exotic disease 
before damages and management costs become too severe. 
 
However, surveillance activities can be costly, depending on the severity of the 
surveillance measures in place and the target value for ‘early detection’ in the local 
environment. It is not hard to imagine that vast sums of money would be required to 
guarantee the detection of a specific exotic disease (much less all other possible diseases) 
in its first generation of growth or transmission, or over the smallest practical surface area 
of an outbreak. On the other hand, some pests and diseases can be so potentially 
damaging if an outbreak goes undetected for a sufficient period of time (or before it 
would be ‘naturally detected’ in the environment, say by local agricultural producers) that 
vast expenditures on early detection are justified.  
 
This paper develops a practical model to determine an optimal surveillance measure 
against an exotic agricultural disease, with an application to the potential entry and spread 
of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) in the United States. Put simply, the idea is to 
minimize the total costs of a disease or FMD incursion, by minimizing the sum of the 
production losses that result from the disease and its transmission, the expenditures that 
go with the surveillance program itself, potential disease management and eradication 
costs, and the losses that result from trade bans and losses in tourism. The control 
variable is the potential target number of herds infected with FMD (which may not be 
zero, or even near zero), or the resulting cost of the surveillance program to generate this 
target. The trade off is simple. Early detection generally implies smaller potential 
production, trade and tourism losses following an FMD incursion, as well as lower 
management and eradication costs after detection occurs. However, the earlier the 
detection of FMD the more expensive is the surveillance activity.  
 
The application to FMD in the United States is an important case study. FMD is one of 
the most contagious diseases of mammals and has a great potential for causing severe 
economic loss in susceptible cloven-hoofed animals. In this regard, the livestock industry 
is the largest sector in the US agriculture, valued at more than $60 billion a year (USDA 
2005), and is potentially at risk. An FMD outbreak could also severely affect related trade 
in agricultural products, valued at $50 billion annually (USDA 2005) and tourism. The 
annual value of livestock exports alone is roughly $USD 300 million (USDA 2005). A 
2 recent study estimated that the cost of an FMD outbreak in southern California alone 
could range between $USD 4.3 to $USD 13.5 billion (Ekboir 1999). The 2001 outbreak 
of FMD in the United Kingdom, with 2,030 confirmed cases of the disease and more than 
6 million animals slaughtered (Hunter et al. 2003), resulted in an estimated $USD 5 
billion direct loss in the food and agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses in the 
tourism industry (GAO 2002, pp. 2, 20).  
 
Section 2 of the paper briefly reviews previous studies of quarantine and surveillance 
measures. Numerical results are very rare even in basic deterministic models. They are 
virtually non-existent in properly defined stochastic models, in part because it is 
computationally demanding to solve stochastic optimal control problems in this setting, 
but also because required parameter values such as the probability of an incursion and the 
growth of transmission, not to mention potential measures of economic damages and 
surveillance costs, are difficult to obtain.  
 
Second 3 provides the model. In general, protection against disease incursion and spread 
takes three forms: border quarantine and inspection, surveillance programs in the local 
environment and disease containment and/or eradication. In some cases, where the 
damages that result from a disease or pest are minimal, it pays to do none of these. In 
other cases, border quarantine measures may be sufficient, or these may be combined 
with reliance on a on a ‘natural detection point’, or the point at which the disease is 
identified in the environment by farmers or the public. Surveillance expenditures in this 
case are unnecessary, and only the cost of containment or eradication matters.  
 
In this paper, current border quarantine measures are taken as given, and the focus instead 
is on optimal surveillance measures. The reason is simple. Given the extensive and 
elaborate Customs and border protection services in place in the US, it is difficult to 
determine what proportion of quarantine activities are directed specifically at FMD, 
making it hard to measure its relative effectiveness. WTO rules also prevent substantial 
and often needed flexibility in the terms of the severity of border quarantine measures, 
thus ruling out the possibility of a complete (or even a highly restrictive) barrier to FMD 
at the border. By their nature, local surveillance activities are much more flexible and are 
an important tool against FMD. Moreover, even where only limited livestock imports are 
permitted it would be impossible, given the many and various pathways, for border 
quarantine to prevent every incursion of FMD. Thus, given the severity of the disease, 
surveillance measures will most likely be needed against FMD in any case. That said, the 
model does allow for the possibility that the ‘natural detection point’ is optimal, or that 
surveillance expenditures are near zero. It also allows for the case that surveillance 
expenditures should be so large as to drive the optimal target number of infected herds to 
near zero. In all cases, given an outbreak of FMD it is assumed that eradication is the 
preferred outcome.  
 
Section 4 of the paper briefly discusses FMD and section 5 outlines the livestock industry 
and current quarantine and surveillance activities in the United States. Section 6 details 
the risk assessment of the probability of an FMD incursion and key parameter values 
3 used to calibrate the model. Section 7, after a description of computational methods, 




2. Previous Studies 
The fundamental relationship between surveillance expenditures and the target number of 
infected herds used in this paper is similar to that of McInerney et al. (1992) and 
McInerney (1996), which maps ‘disease control’ expenditures to production losses. An 
exact form of the surveillance expenditure function is contained in Kompas and Che 
(2003), which models border quarantine expenditures against a potential entry of Ovine 
Johne Disease to the sheep industry in Western Australia (WA). This model is similar in 
structure to the surveillance model used in this paper, but is it not an explicit stochastic 
optimal control model. Instead, it uses a genetic algorithm to directly minimize the cost 
of the disease and expenditures on the border quarantine program itself. Kompas et al. 
(2004) develops a related surveillance model for Papua fruit fly and its potential entry 
into Australia. The model has a probability of incursion but is also not an explicit 
stochastic control model. It is basically deterministic in structure, in a manner similar to a 
paper by Jensen (2002). Chi (2002) constructs an empirical model for the spread and 
control of infectious diseases on dairy farms and Zhao (2006) provides a dynamic disease 
model for FMD in the beef industry in the United Sates, nicely capturing producer 
response to a disease outbreak in a deterministic setting. The latter paper also details the 
tradeoffs associated with various disease management responses. A deterministic optimal 
control model of disease spread is constructed in Bicknell et al. (1999), focusing on 
private decisions on the level of diagnostic testing. Optimal quarantine and surveillance 
activities are not modeled, but it is argued that profit maximizing producers cannot be 
expected to eradicate a disease and that the current mix of policies to control bovine 
tuberculosis in New Zealand is achieving lower levels of prevalence than would occur in 
the absence of a national strategy.  
 
Biological studies of the spread and management of exotic diseases, albeit with little or 
no explicit economic relationships, are numerous. Pech and Hone (1988) and Saphores 
and Shogren (2005) provide two good examples. Nunn (1997) provides a clear discussion 
of the structure of quarantine risk analysis, much of which is directly applicable to 
surveillance activities. A call for more extensive analyses of quarantine and related 
animal disease issues is nicely set out in James and Anderson (1998), and in terms of its 
impacts on international trade, in Mumford (2002).  
 
3. Model Context 
 
The model has five main components: (1) a biological model to describe both the growth 
and density growth of infected herds; (2) a surveillance expenditure function that maps 
the cost of surveillance to the spread of the disease and the point of detection; (3) a 
measure of production losses before detection occurs; (4) disease management costs, and 
trade and other losses that result during the disease management period, either in terms of 
4 disease containment or the time it takes for eradication; and (5) the stochastic process and 
objective function.  
 
3.1 Growth and density growth of infected livestock 
The unit of measurement is a ‘herd’, where the number of livestock in a herd will vary 
depending on whether it is dairy or beef cows, sheep or swine. Based on FMD 
development in a number of known cases in Europe, the Middle East and South America, 
the growth in the number of infected herds is assumed to follow a Verhulst-Pearl logistic 











⎟                                                  (1) 
 
for  () Nt the number of infected herds at time t, g the intrinsic or biological growth rate 
and  max N  the maxmium number of infected herds, relative to the environmental ‘carrying 











⎟                                                  (2) 
 
for z the density growth rate, D(t) the ratio of the number of infected herds to total herds 
and  max D  the maximum density rate.  
 
3.2 Surveillance expenditure function  
A surveillance expenditure function maps surveillance expenditures to a point of early 
detection of a disease incursion, expressed in terms of the number of potentially infected 
animals in the population. Larger surveillance expenditures (e.g., blood and viral tests, 
screening, physical examination) generally result in points of ‘earlier’ detection and a 
smaller number of potentially infected livestock. Define  m R  as the number of infected 
animals occurring at the ‘natural detection point’, or where the disease incursion is self-
evident or recognized by farmers and/or the public, without any surveillance 
expenditures. Let  m E  be the amount of surveillance expenditures that will ensure the 
earliest possible detection, or where the number of infected animals is either near zero, 
depending on the efficacy of border quarantine measures, or the incursion is detected 
before almost no spread of the disease. This amount can be finite, but it may also be 














+                                                      (3) 
 
for  X  the target number of infected animals that potentially enter a population and η a 
surveillance effectiveness parameter. The higher the value of η the lower the expenditure 
on surveillance for a given number of infected livestock, or the more convex is the 
5 expenditure function. When  0 η =  the expenditure function is linear; in all other cases, 
for  0 η > , the marginal benefit of surveillance decreases with a decrease in the target 
value X .  
 
3.3 Production loss  
Once a potentially harmful disease is detected there are two management possibilities, 
eradication or containment. For FMD, eradication is the preferred option in most cases. 
FMD results in losses in animal weight and production that occur until the point of 
detection and the successful completion of an eradication campaign. This potential 
production cost before detection depends on the length of the time over which the disease 
has developed and the time to eradication. For the moment, assume that production loss 
at time t depends both on the number of herds and density and is given by  
 
            () () () pp Ct c N t D t =                                                       (4) 
 
for  p c average production loss per herd. For simplicity, it is assumed that any reduction in 
infected herds (through containment or eradication) implies that both density and infected 
herd numbers are reduced proportionately.  
 
3.4 Disease management and trade and tourism losses  
An outbreak of FMD immediately generates disease management costs. Generally, all 
livestock in an infected heard are destroyed, including feedstuff and milk, and additional 
costs are incurred through disinfection and cleaning activities. Within the designated 
buffer zone, φ , or the area that defines the FMD eradication zone, vaccination costs are 
also imposed for all animals entering the area for at least two years after a successful 
eradication campaign. Assuming that all costs are proportional to the target number of 
potentially infected herds X  gives 
 
  me me mv mv Cc X Cc X φ = =                                                (5) 
   
for  me C  eradication costs and  mv C  vaccination costs, with average cost parameters  me c  
and  mv c .  
 
An FMD outbreak also generates an immediate trade ban for exported livestock products 
to disease free areas. The cost here can be considerable. In addition, the tourism industry 
also suffers losses due to travel restrictions and quarantine provisions. The loss in tourism 
revenue in the recent UK FMD outbreak, for example, was estimated to be well over a 
billion dollars (GAO 2002, pp. 2, 20). Trade and tourism losses depend on the length of 
time length for disease management, or until a FMD free status is declared. In general, 
the larger the number of infected herds the longer the disease management period, with a 
minimum of 24 weeks in all known cases. Let the length of time for disease management 
( m T ) be given by   
 
6 0 m TX α β = +                                                          (6) 
 
where  0 α  is the minimum time for disease management andβ is a given parameter.   
Trade and tourism losses ( tt C ) are thus  
 
( ) 12 tt tr tou m CY Y αα =+ T                                                 (7) 
 
where  tr Y  and  tou Y  is the gross value of livestock trade and relevant tourism respectively, 
and  1 α  and  2 α  are parameters.  
 
3.5 Stochastic process and objective function 
The basic idea is to construct a stochastic optimal control problem, with a jump-diffusion 
process. Assume that both a disease incursion  i Q  and a disease detection  d Q  are Poisson 
processes, with an incursion arrival rate  0.03 i λ =  and a detection arrival rate that 











+                                                      (8) 
 
where θ  and δ  are positive coefficients. The functional form of  d λ  ensures that the rate 
of detection will be maximised when the number of infected herds reaches the target 
value X, and be zero when  () 0 Nt= . Assume as well that that any infected herds and 
density growth are affected by (non-correlated) Brownian processes  N W  and  D W  with 
standard deviations  0.05 ( ) N Nt σ =  and  0.05 ( ) D Dt σ = . Using this and equation (1) and 
(2), equations of motion for the number of infected herds and density are given by  
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where detection is immediately followed by a process of eradication, which decreases the 
number of infected herds and their density, where Ne and De take on positive values if 
eradication is unsuccessful or zero if it is successful.  
.  
The problem now is to minimize the discounted value over time of total costs (ρ  is the 
discount rate) associated with the FMD, including surveillance expenditures, production 
7 losses, disease management costs and trade and tourism losses. Using equations (3) to (7) 
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subject to motion equations (9) and (10), where the control variable is the target number 
of potentially infected herds X and E is the usual expectations operator. The third term on 
the right-hand side of equation (11) is the production loss or cost of an initial incursion 
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using equations of motion and relevant first and second order variations on 
(( ) ,( ) ) CNt Dt , with respect to N and D.  
 
4. Foot and Mouth Disease 
 
Foot and Mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious disease of susceptible cloven-
hoofed animals. The potential economic losses from a disease incursion can be enormous.  
As mentioned, the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom resulted in over $5 
billion in losses in the food and agricultural sectors alone, as well as comparable losses to 
8 its tourism industry (GAO, 2002, pp. 2, 20). FMD hosts are typically cattle, sheep and 
swine, but the disease can also occur in domestic and water buffalos, goats, yaks and 
zebras. Animals become infected through inhalation, ingestion and by venereal 
transmission. The primary mechanism of spread within herds is by direct contact, through 
inhalation of virus aerosols. Under the right conditions long distance spread of FMD by 
wind-borne virus can occur over a number of kilometers. However, contact between and 
movement of infected animals is the most common pathways for the spread of the disease 
between herds. Other sources of infection include contaminated vehicles, equipment, 
people and farm products. The FMD virus can also survive for long periods in meat as 
well as in frozen lymph nodes, bone marrow, salted and cured meats and non-pasteurized 
dairy products. It has also been shown experimentally that FMD can be transmitted 
through artificial insemination where semen from infected animals is used. 
 
There are seven serotypes of the FMD virus. Infection with one serotype does not confer 
immunity against another. At present FMD is endemic in parts of Asia, Africa, the 
Middle East and South America. The incubation period is short but varies and the clinical 
signs of the disease are usually mild and may be masked by other conventional 
conditions, allowing the disease to go unidentified for some period of time. Typical cases 
of FMD are characterized by a vesicular condition of the feet, mucosa and the mammary 
glands in females. Diagnosis is obtained through examination of vesicles or vesicular 
fluid, and where this is not possible from blood samples or throat swabs (in pigs). The 
mortality rate for non-adult animals infected with FMD varies and depends on the species 
and strain of the virus. In most cases adult animals usually recover once the disease has 
run its course. However, because the disease leaves them severely debilitated, meat-
producing animals do not normally regain their lost weight for many months, if at all, and 
dairy cows seldom produce milk at their former rate, causing severe losses in the 
production of meat and milk (GAO, 2002, p. 12). 
 
 
5. The Livestock Industry and Quarantine and Surveillance 
Activities in the USA 
 
There is about 2.1 million livestock in the US, including almost 1 million major dairy and 
beef farms, 73,800 sheep and lamb farms, 20,300 pig farms and more than a million 
small cattle farms.  For over four decades, the live cattle industry has been the largest 
sector in agriculture contributing on average $US 62.4 billion gross value of production a 
year or almost 30 per cent of the major agricultural output (NASS 2005).  Production 
occurs throughout the country but is concentrated in the Midwest States, Texas, 
California and the Northeast. Beef cows in particular accounted for 78.6 per cent of the 
total cow inventory in 2005, with a relatively large number of operators, or 774,630 
farms. Large farms of 100 head or more account for only 10 per cent of total farms but 
more than half of the total beef cow inventory.  
 
The US has been declared disease free of FMD since 1929. Between 1870 and 1929 
FMD incursions occurred 8 times, with the most devastating in 1914 resulting in the loss 
of more than 100,000 livestock. The potential impact of FMD on the livestock industry 
9 depends on the distribution of cattle and their susceptibility from state to state. 
Susceptibility depends on livestock concentration and a host of natural conditions, 
generating different risk assessments. The standard measure used is that by Miller (1979), 
who developed a model of an FMD epidemic, dividing the country into three risk zones. 
Zone 3 is designated as the zone with the highest risk of incursion and spread of FMD. 
Table 1 indicates the number of farms by state, their risk level and the number of what 
are termed Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) inspections, or field investigations and 
diagnostic laboratory surveillance, for FMD in 2005. Of the total number of farms 
(2,113,470) in 2005, 1,822,360 were classified in zone 3, with 75 per cent of these 
(1,366,788) designated as highly susceptible.   
 
Preventing the incursion and spread of FMD involves both border inspections and border 
quarantine and field surveillance measures. Again, there are a number of key pathways 
through which FMD could potentially enter the United States: live animal imports, 
imports of animal and other products, international passengers and their luggage, garbage 
from international carriers, international mail, and military personnel and equipment 
returning from overseas. For each of these pathways, the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) has developed and implemented specific preventive measures (GAO 
2002, pp. 38-43). For example, the USDA allows imports of livestock only from 
countries deemed to be free of FMD and other diseases of concern, through designated 
ports of entry. Livestock brought to the US must have an import permit and a health 
certificate from an official government veterinarian in the country of origin.  The health 
certificate states that the animals have been in the exporting country for at least 60 days 
prior to shipment and are free of any diseases of concern. Food and non-food (hay, grass 
and farm equipment) imports are allowed from FMD infected countries under strict 
conditions. In cooperation among Customs, the USDA and the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS), all animals, food and non-food products are subject to 
inspection at the border and potential quarantine to determine their FMD or other disease 
status. Customs is authorized to either release shipments into commerce or hold them for 
USDA inspection and the USDA provides Customs with a list of products to be flagged 
for inspection by APHIS.  
 
It is impossible to guarantee that the FMD virus will be stopped at the border in every 
case. Border quarantine is supplemented with surveillance on farms and in the local 
environment. In the United States the National Animal Health Surveillance System 
(NAHSS) is responsible for this activity, including field investigations and diagnostic 
laboratory surveillance. These FAD investigations are conducted by specially trained 
Federal, State and privately accredited veterinarians, along with trained farmers who 
check for suspicious clinical signs. From 1997 to 2004, the number of FAD 
investigations per year in the 50 states and Puerto Rico ranged from a low of 254 in 1997 
to a high of 1,013 in 2004. There were 689 vesicular complaints, of which 511 were in 
horses, donkeys, and mules and 178 in other species (e.g., ruminants and swine). 
Generally, vesicular conditions in species other than equines are considered suggestive of 
FMD (NAHSS 2005).  The most FAD investigations in 2005 were conducted in 
California, Louisiana, Texas, Illinois, Tennessee and Wisconsin (see table 1).  
 
10 Along with field investigations, the recognition of the suspicious clinical signs for FMD 
depends very much on the general public awareness, and educational campaigns to 
heighten that awareness. However it is difficult to recognize FMD, and distinguish it 
from other similar diseases, which are much less harmful, such as vesicular stomatitis, 
bovine viral diarrhea and foot rot. Two foreign swine diseases (swine vesicular disease 
and vesicular exanthema of swine) are also clinically identical to FMD. Therefore, the 
only way to distinguish between FMD and these other diseases is through laboratory 
analyses of fluid and tissue samples (GAO 2002).   
 
Currently diagnostic testing for FMD is restricted to the Foreign Animal Disease 
Diagnostic Laboratory located at Plum Island, which routinely performs diagnostic tests 
for FMD as a part of FAD investigation (Bates et al. 2003b). This single lab would be 
quickly overwhelmed in the event of an FMD outbreak. For example, the 2001 FMD 
outbreak in the UK required 15,000 sample tests as part of its eradication program and 
more than a million tests to establish a disease-free confirmation (GAO, 2002).  Recently, 
the USDA has initiated improvements to its diagnostic and research facilities in Ames, 
Iowa and Plum Island, and more than $USDA 15.3 million was allocated to the 
Agricultural Research Service to improve ‘rapid detection technology’ for FMD as well 




6. Risk Assessment and Key Parameter Values 
Calibration of the model requires both a risk assessment on a probable disease incursion 
and key parameter values. The key parameter set includes: (1) incursion and biological 
parameters; (2) parameters in the surveillance expenditure function; and (3) production 
cost, disease management and trade tourism parameters.  
 
6.1 Incursion and biological parameters  
Key incursion and biological parameters are drawn from the GAO (2002) and Bates et al. 
(2001, 2003a, 2003b). The probability of a FMD incursion is the most difficult parameter 
to determine. The probability is thought to be increasing over time with increases in 
international trade and the growing prevalence of the disease in various of the world, but 
its precise measure for the United States is unclear. With current quarantine restrictions in 
place, a possibility of an outbreak once in every 30 years is commonly discussed. Subject 
to sensitivity analysis, the annual probability of an incursion  i λ  is thus roughly taken as 
0.03. The transmission or growth rate of the disease is more easily known, with studies 
drawn from the recent UK experience (GAO 2002) and Uruguay (Chowell et al. 2005 
and FVO 2002). The value g is taken as 0.45 per cent per week and density growth z is 
0.2 per cent per week. According to USDA estimates (GAO 2002), the potential number 
of initial infected herds  0 N  is 15 and maximum number of infected herds  max N  is 81,000. 
The initial density  0 D  is taken as 5 per cent of a given herd, maximum density  max D  is 75 
per cent and the eradication zone is typically (in practice) set at a radius 9 times the 
radius of the original area in which infected livestock were found. In order to determine 
the detection rate, values of  52*1.1 θ =  and  0.1 δ =  are assumed.  
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6.2 Surveillance expenditure function parameters 
Parameter values for equation (3), the surveillance expenditure function, are based on 
Bates, (2003a, 2003b). Current surveillance expenditures against FMD in the United 
States are roughly $USD 8.29 million. This is based on FAD operating expenses of 
$USD 24 million and associated capital (laboratories and equipment) of more than 
$USD140 million. The cost of surveillance on FMD, given the 834 FAD investigations 
(table 1), for a number of different diseases, is thought to be about 25 per cent of the total 
operating budget and roughly 35 per cent of the value of all labs and equipment. A 5 per 
cent interest rate is used to account for capital costs.  Detecting FMD in the first week of 
outbreak is estimated to require at least 2,000 individual FAD inspections for FMD alone, 
compared to 200 in 2005. The ‘natural detection point’ or  m R  is calculated to be 4,000 
herds and  m E  is 10 times current expenditures or $USD 82.9 million. The value of η, or 
the surveillance effectiveness parameter, is thus approximated by  .0021 η = . Based on 
equation (3) the target number of infected herds under the current surveillance program is 
2000 herds.  
 
6.3 Production cost, disease management and trade tourism parameters 
Herd size varies across different livestock, as does the cost of production losses 
associated with an FMD outbreak. In this paper it is assumed that the cost of the disease 
in terms of production loss occurs only at the farm level (directly, for example, affecting 
milk and meat production), and not to the indirect farm sector (such as transportation, 
retail and supporting industries). It is also assumed that only beef, dairy, sheep and pig 
industries are potentially subjected to FMD. Average cost or production losses are drawn 
from a USDA study (USDA 2005) with a value of  0.224 p c =  in equation (4), and are 
comparable to average production losses in the 2001 UK outbreak (GAO 2002).  
 
Average indemnity cost is estimated to be roughly $USD 224,000 per herd. This value is 
estimated from the average market value of livestock (Bates et al. 2003a), average herd 
sizes and the proportional share of dairy, beef, pig and sheep farms in susceptible areas 
(USDA 2005). The market value per head for dairy heifer, heifer calves, sheep and pigs is 
$1,200, $602, $231 and $120 per head respectively in USD (Bates et al. 2003a). The 
average cost of cleaning and disinfection is $USD 18,062 per herd and vaccination costs 
are $USD 2,960 per herd (Bates et al. 2003a). The vaccination zone, once again, is taken 
as 8 times the size of the radius of the initial infestation, as simulated in the study of a 
hypothetical outbreak of FMD in California (Bates et al. 2001). In equations (5), φ  is 
thus 8 and the calculated average disease management costs, or  me c  and  mv c , are 0.018 
and 0.00296 respectively.  
 
The value of  0 α  in equation (6) is 24 weeks, the usual minimum time requirement for 
FMD free status assuming the disease can be detected and eradicated in the first week of 
incursion. For time periods longer than this,  0.008 β = , based on the UK experience 
(DEFRA 2002). Losses from trade bans and falls in tourism depend on the time length of 
disease management. The average weekly gross value of exported livestock is $USD 5.7 
12 million (USDA 2005) and the average weekly value of all tourist activities is estimated to 
be 0.7 billion (USCB 2005). Clearly only a small part of contractions in tourist revenue 
will be due to an FMD outbreak. The values of  1 α  and  2 α  in equation (7) are taken as 0.1 
and 0.005, roughly (again) the same proportions as in the recent UK experience (GAO 
2002 and DAFRD 2002).  
 
7. Computation, Results and Sensitivity Measures 
A solution to equation (13) is obtained through a finite difference method (see Judd1999) 
for a given X, and then X is varied to find the target value of X that minimizes total costs 
in (13). The finite difference method maps a total cost function defined across a domain 
0m a x 0m a x ( ... , ... ) NN DD  in a grid pattern where the distance between the closet node in 
dimension N is h and in dimension D it is k. In total there will be HK ∗ nodes, where 
max 0 () / HN Nh =− 1 +  and  max 0 () / KD Dk =− 1 + . At an arbitrary node (, ) ij, denote 
(, ) ij CC i j =  and approximate the partial derivatives of the cost function  (,) CND by  
 
  1, ( Ni j i j CC C + ) / h = −                                                  (14) 
 
2
1, 1, (2 ) / NN i j ij i j CC C C +− =− + h                                         (15) 
  1, ( Di j i j CC C + ) / k = −                                                  (16) 
and the variation 
 
2
,1 ,1 (2 ) / D D ij i j ij CC C C +− =− + k                                         (17) 
 
 
Substituting (14)-(17) into equation (13) and thus approximating  ij C  defines the cost 
function and a system of  0 (/ ) (/ HNh KDK +∗ + 0 )  unknowns in HK ∗  to solve for 
each  ij C . When  0 ND == ,  ,1 i C −  and  1, j C−  will vanish, and closure is provided by two 
boundary conditions specifying that the cost function becomes ‘flat’ at levels of N and D 
that exceed  max N  and  max D . In other words, once maximum carrying capacity is reached, 
in both the number of infected herds and density, it is assumed that there are no 
additional economic costs to a disease incursion.   
 
With this method, solving (13) is now equivalent to solving a basic linear system. 
However, as the grid for the finite difference method defining the cost function gets finer, 
or with more defined nodes, computational time increases rapidly. Even with a modest 
grid size of dimension 200 by 200, the relevant matrix will have a dimension of 40,000-
squared, and with 8 bytes per element requires approximately 12 gigabytes of RAM to 
store the matrix. To reduce computational time both a sparse matrix and iteration method 
are used. Sparse matrix methods keep only non-zero elements of the relevant matrix and 
the iteration method helps to reduce computation time in comparison with traditional 
matrix inversion method. We also employ a Richardson extrapolation method (see 
Marchuk & Shaidurov, 1983) to refine the solution with relatively smaller number of 
nodes. To further accelerate convergence of the iterative methods the BiCGSTAB (or 
biconjugate gradient stabilized) routine, first introduced by Vorst (1992), and the PETSC 
13 library package (see Balay et al. 2004, 2001,1997) are used. The model is coded in the C 
programming language. 
 
An example of a mapped total cost function is given in figure 1, with a grid size of 800 
by 800. This function is mapped over the entire range of costs in million USD defined 
over density and the number of infected herds. The increasing wave-like pattern is due to 
a new incursion stepping beyond, at some point, a given eradication zone. A disease 
incursion, in other words, thus results in an immediate jump in costs, which increase 
given the properties of equations (4) to (7), until a new incursion is realized past the 
given or current eradication zone.  
 
Using the risk assessment and all key parameter values from section 6, the minimum 
value cost function obtained by varying the number of potentially infected herds X is 
given in figure 2. All growth and density rates and potential damages are translated into 
yearly measures. The optimal value of X is 405 herds at a potential disease incursion cost 
of $USD 4,320.23 million or roughly 4.3 billion US dollars. Using equation (3), optimal 
surveillance expenditures against an FMD incursion amount to roughly $USD 40.3 
million per year. Current annual surveillance expenditures are approximately $USD 8.29 
million, and thus far below optimal values. Current expenditures, assuming that current 
policy was consistently applied with equation (3) operating, in fact act as if the target was 
2,000 potentially infected herds, rather than 405.   
 
Sensitivity across key parameter values varies considerably. For example, a change in the 
growth rate of disease transmission is relatively insensitive: an increase in the growth rate 
of more than 16 times results in only a 0.7 per cent change in total incursion costs and a 
negligible variation in the target value of X. A change in the density growth rate has even 
less of an effect, with virtually no change in the target number of infected herds over a 
wide rang of parameter values. (Tables indicating all results for changes in growth and 
density rates across a range of parameter values are available from the authors on 
request.)  The reason for these outcomes is straightforward. Although a higher growth 
rate for disease transmission causes more damages, it is also more likely to be detected 
earlier, and hence controlled and eradicated. In terms of density growth, higher density 
growth rates do create more production losses initially, but an outbreak of FMD 
immediately creates an eradication zone in which all animals are destroyed regardless of 
their density growth.  
 
In terms of sensitivity results, differences in the probability of an FMD incursion do 
matter, and considerably. Table 2 shows the total costs of a disease incursion in million 
USD with different probabilities (p) of a disease incursion and the optimal target number 
of infected herds (X). The benchmark case is  0.03 p =  and  405 X = . An increase in the 
probability of an incursion to 0.036 results in the optimal target for X falling to 330; a fall 
in the probability of an incursion to 0.024 increases X to 510. It is important to note that 
even at a very low incursion rate and target of  510 X =   optimal surveillance 
expenditures are still $USD 34.9 million dollars, or more than four times more than 
current surveillance expenditures in the United States. In table 3 an increase in the 
average production losses clearly decreases the optimal target X. The benchmark case is 
14 0.22 p c = . An increase in  p c to 0.31, for example, decreases X to 370, with an annual 
surveillance expenditure of roughly $USD 42 million. Table 4 shows some limited 
sensitivity between the size of the eradication zone and the optimal target number of 
infected herds X. The benchmark is 8. The larger the eradication zone the larger the 
resulting damages in production and disease management costs, and thus the smaller the 
target number of infected herds.  
 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Surveillance activates provide an important means of protection against the importation 
and spread of exotic diseases, especially those that can do enormous harm to local 
agricultural production. However, surveillance programs also impose costs in the form of 
expenditures on the surveillance program itself, along with the costs of disease 
management and eradication should an incursion occur. Taking border quarantine 
expenditures as given, this paper develops a model to determine the optimal level of 
surveillance activity against a disease incursion and spread by minimizing the present 
value of the major direct and indirect costs of the disease, as well as the costs of the 
surveillance and disease management and eradication programs. The model is applied to 
surveillance activities against a potential entry of FMD in the United States.  
 
The model allows for both zero surveillance expenditures, or reliance simply on a 
‘natural detection point’, as well as the possibility that surveillance expenditures should 
be sufficiently large to drive the optimal number of potentially infected herds close to 
zero, with detection and eradicated at the earliest possible moment. Final results generate 
an intermediate case, showing a target number of 405 infected herds with $USD 40.3 
million in annual surveillance expenditures, or almost five times larger than the current 
$USD 8.29 annual surveillance expenditure program in the United States. These results 
were obtained assuming no indirect costs of an FMD incursion on retail and 
transportation sectors, or any other farm-related activities, and by assuming that the 
probability of an incursion is only once in every 30 years. Assuming that this rate falls to 
once in every 40 years still generates at annual expenditure of roughly $USD 35 million, 
well above current values.  
 
An essential aspect of homeland security is to protect the United States against costly and 
potentially devastating disease incursions and spread. Surveillance activities offer an 
effective and flexible means of protecting against such events. With regard to FMD, the 
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18 Table 1: Number of livestock farms by state, FMD risk and FAD surveillance   
State  No of farms  Risk Zone  No of FAD investigations 
Alabama            45,000  3  7 
Alaska                610  3  30 
Arizona            10,300  2  17 
Arkansas            47,500  3  12 
California            78,500  1  159 
Colorado            31,400  2  16 
Connecticut              4,200  3  1 
Delaware              2,300  3  0 
Florida            44,000  3  14 
Georgia            49,300  3  36 
Hawai              5,500  3  0 
Idaho            25,000  2  26 
Illinois            73,000  3  55 
Indiana            59,500  3  4 
Iowa            90,000  3  27 
Kansas            64,500  3  12 
Kentucky            87,000  3  6 
Louisiana            27,200  3  66 
Maine              7,200  3  1 
Maryland            12,100  3  3 
Massachusetts              6,100  3  7 
Michigan            53,300  3  10 
Minnesota            80,000  3  3 
Mississippi            42,800  3  4 
Missouri          106,000  3  2 
Montana            28,000  2  4 
Nebraska            48,500  3  16 
Nevada              3,000  2  0 
New Hampshire              3,400  3  2 
New Jersey              9,900  3  5 
New Mexico            17,500  2  16 
New York            37,000  3  6 
North Carolina            53,500  3  13 
North Dakota            30,300  3  10 
Ohio            77,600  3  9 
Oklahoma            83,500  3  8 
Oregon            40,000  1  9 
Pennsylvania            58,200  3  12 
Rhode Island                850  3  5 
South Carolina            24,400  3  10 
South Dakota            31,600  3  3 
Tennessee            87,000  3  44 
Texas          229,000  3  62 
Utah            15,300  2  9 
Vermont              6,500  3  3 
Virginia            47,500  3  17 
Washington            35,500  1  11 
West Virginia            20,800  3  0 
Wisconsin            76,500  3  38 
Wyoming              9,200  2  4 
Total   2,113,470    834 
Sources: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 2005; Miller, 1979; and the National 
Animal Health Surveillance System (NAHSS). (2005). 




Figure 2: Optimal target value of infected herds X  and costs from a disease 
incursion 
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  310 330 350 370 405 430 450 490 510 530
0.024 3652.85 3643.23 3634.95 3627.92 3618.36 3613.49 3610.66 3607.59 3607.25  3607.64
0.027 3993.15 3985.78 3979.76 3974.98 3969.37 3967.31 3966.73 3968.16 3970.07 3972.71
0.030 4333.32 4328.21 4324.44 4321.91 4320.23 4320.98 4322.65 4328.57 4332.72 4337.6
0.033 4673.39 4670.52 4668.99 4668.71 4670.96 4674.51 4678.41 4688.81 4695.19 4702.31
0.036 5013.34 5012.71  5013.43 5015.38 5021.54 5027.88 5034.02 5048.88 5057.5 5066.84
 
  
Table 3: The total costs of a FMD incursion in million USD with variations in 
average production losses (cp) and the optimal target number of infected herds (X) 
 
cp X 
  350 370 390 405 410 430 450 470
0.13 4301.67 4298.07 4295.64 4294.53 4294.29 4293.94 4294.54 4296.02
0.18 4313.05 4309.99 4308.09 4307.38 4307.27 4307.46 4308.59 4310.61
0.22 4324.44 4321.91 4320.55 4320.23 4320.26 4320.98 4322.65 4325.19
0.27 4335.82 4333.83 4333.00 4333.09 4333.24 4334.5 4336.7 4339.78
0.31 4347.21 4345.45  4345.75 4345.94 4346.23 4348.02 4350.75 4354.36
 
 
Table 4: The total costs of a FMD incursion in million USD with variations in the 
size of the eradication zone (φ) and the optimal target number of infected herds (X) 
 
φ  X 
  395 400 405 410 415 420
1.6 4315.91 4315.75 4315.65 4315.62 4315.66 4315.75
4.8 4318.14 4318.01 4317.94 4317.94 4318.00 4318.12
8.0 4320.38 4320.27 4320.23 4320.26 4320.35 4320.5
11.2 4322.61 4322.53 4322.52 4322.58 4322.69 4322.87
14.4 4324.84 4324.79 4324.81 4324.89 4325.04 4325.25
 
22 